

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH MEETING
THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 26 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 19 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. T. MBU

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. ECSANNAE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. D. TEHCV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. Z. SEINER

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. CBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. D. NEDA

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. C. A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. I. B. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J. G. TAGGARDIN

Mr. J. M. EDES

Mr. R. C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE

Mr. A. L. RICHARDS

Mr. D. E. MARK

Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the one hundred and forty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In the debate on item 5(d) of our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) the representative of the Soviet Union has severely criticized the United States proposals for first stage measures for beginning the reduction of nuclear weapons. He and his Eastern European colleagues have argued repeatedly that two provisions in stage I of the United States draft outline (ENDC/30, pp.8, 9) which we consider important are inadequate in their view, and hence unacceptable; I am referring to the cessation of the production of weapons-grade fissile material and the transfer of significant agreed quantities of such material to non-weapons uses.

If I understand our Soviet colleague correctly, he does not quarrel with the concept of those measures. I say this because the cut-off of production and the transfer of fissile material to peaceful purposes both appear among the provisions aiming at the total elimination of nuclear weapons proposed in article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1). But Mr. Tsarapkin's criticism is that these measures in the United States draft outline will not put a complete stop to the nuclear arms race and abolish the threat of nuclear war. Since they will not do all this, he denounces the Western approach and goes so far as to accuse us of lack of sincerity on our commitment to total nuclear disarmament.

To take up the last point first, I am obliged by what the representative of the Soviet Union said at the end of our meeting of 12 June (ENDC/PV.143, p.42) to repeat what I thought I had already made clear at that same meeting (*ibid*, p.29): the Western Powers are resolved that nuclear weapons shall be completely eliminated from the arsenals of States by the end of stage III of the programme of general and complete disarmament. We have accepted this goal unconditionally by subscribing to the relevant paragraph of the statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5). We have also committed ourselves in this respect in Section C of stage III of the United States draft outline of basic provisions (ENDC/30) which is before this Committee.

Mr. Tsarapkin and other socialist representatives argue that our commitment to this goal is in some way qualified or vitiated because we have proposed that expert studies be undertaken of the means by which the goal is to be attained. That argument will not stand analysis. To recognize frankly, as we have done, that the verified reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons pose problems of the greatest difficulty; to propose;

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

as we have done, to pool our technical ingenuity and to work in a joint effort to solve these problems -- that surely cannot be reasonably interpreted as an attempt to avoid the responsibility to fulfil the commitment to achieve total nuclear disarmament. I suggest that those who confess that there are difficulties to be overcome before the goal can be reached, and who are prepared to undertake at once a careful study of how those obstacles are to be surmounted, thereby prove they are more serious in their intention to get rid of nuclear weapons than those who seek to ignore or belittle the problems and who refuse to participate in the search for their solution.

Returning to the argument of the representative of the Soviet Union that the measures in the first stage of the United States outline are unacceptable because they would not abolish the threat of nuclear war, we answer that by saying that no single measure in any one stage can eliminate that threat; it must be done by appropriate measures through the whole programme of disarmament. On the basis of a thorough examination of what elimination of nuclear weapons involves, we have reached the conclusion that there are problems from the standpoint of verification, technology and security which impose certain limits on the reduction of nuclear weapons which can be carried out in the first stage of the disarmament programme. And those are limits imposed not by us, but by hard facts.

Some of those hard facts have been explained very clearly by the United Kingdom delegation in its working paper (ENDC/60) -- and I might add that the Canadian delegation would hope to hear, in due course, the considered response of the Soviet representative to at least some of the very pertinent questions asked by Sir Paul Mason at our meeting of 12 June (ENDC/PV.143, pp.33, 34). Meanwhile, I wish to emphasize that the Western Powers, after scientific analysis of the problems which must be overcome, have been led to propose that the process of nuclear disarmament be begun at the earliest moment in the disarmament programme by the cessation of production of weapons-grade fissile material and the transfer of quantities thereof to peaceful uses.

Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union will reply to what I have said by claiming once more that if the provisions of article 22 of the Soviet Union draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) were implemented nuclear weapons would vanish entirely and there would be no need for partial and staged measures. The point here is that there is a big "if": if all parties could be assured that all nuclear weapons could be eliminated. But the Soviet Union has told us nothing about how this unconditional assurance -- unconditional

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

verification -- could be achieved. In fact, I believe it knows that it cannot, as its frequently quoted statement of May 1955 witnesses (DC/71, Annex 15). So it is wrong to suggest that the Soviet Union article 22, or any other single measure, could eliminate the danger of nuclear war at one stroke and practically instantaneously. I submit that enough data have already been produced by the Western Powers in this Committee to substantiate fully our view that the provisions of that article 22 of the Soviet draft are more like wishful thinking than serious proposals capable of practical implementation.

What changes would be required in the Soviet plan to make the present provisions of its article 22 more realistic and more in accord with the hard facts? In the past Mr. Tsarapkin has been good enough on occasion to invite suggestions for amendments to Soviet proposals; that encourages me to offer a few comments on ways in which the provisions which now make up article 22 could be altered and distributed so as to constitute a more practicable approach to nuclear disarmament -- or, more specifically, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

My first suggestion is that article 22 is deficient in not providing for joint expert studies of the means to achieve nuclear disarmament. As I recalled at our meeting of 12 June (ENDC/PV.143, p.26), the Soviet Union did include a provision for such studies in its plan submitted to the General Assembly in 1960 (A/4505, Ch.III, Art.9). Since we see no reason why the Soviet Union should not still believe such studies are necessary, I suggest that it consider including a provision similar to that which appeared in its 1960 plan in the first stage of its present draft.

My second suggestion relates to paragraph 1(a) of article 22. Instead of calling for the complete elimination of "all nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities" in stage II (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.16), as is now the case, I would suggest that the Soviet Union amend its position by proposing that nuclear weapons capability be reduced in each of several stages by a definite amount. If it would do that, it seems to me that a realistic proposal for a specified reduction in nuclear weapons capability could then figure appropriately in stage I of the Soviet draft. Further proportioned reductions could be included in subsequent stages so that at the end of stage III total elimination would be achieved.

Thirdly, I would suggest that paragraph 2(a) of article 22, providing for the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and the destruction of production facilities, could be modified. The provisions of this paragraph, with certain

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

changes, should in my view be split between the several stages. The Western Powers have pointed out that the cessation of production of fissile materials is a measure which does not pose very difficult problems from the standpoint of verification, nor would it require the imposition of control measures which would be unduly extensive in an early stage of the disarmament process; hence this measure could go into stage I. The provisions for the elimination of "all plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components" contained in paragraph 2(a) could remain, provided that an exception were made for such agreed facilities as might be necessary for replacements of those nuclear weapons which would be required for the deterrent forces on both sides.

Towards the end of the disarmament programme, when international confidence is such that the mutual deterrent forces can be abolished, the remaining nuclear weapons should of course be eliminated. My fourth point, therefore, is that the provision for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, which now appears in paragraph 3 of article 22 as a second stage measure, should be transferred to stage III of the Soviet draft.

I hope that the Soviet representative will consider carefully the merits of the suggestions I have made regarding article 22. I believe that the discussion of item 5(a) in this Committee, when placed in the context of our earlier examination of items 5(b) and (c), has shown clearly that alterations along the lines I have suggested would represent, at any rate, minimum steps in the direction of compromise which the Soviet Union should undertake before it can justify a claim that its approach to nuclear disarmament takes into account the basic problems involved in this field. If the Soviet Union were to revise article 22 by re-distributing its provisions progressively throughout the various stages of the disarmament programme, it would show us that it is prepared to acknowledge the existence of the hard facts of nuclear disarmament. Until the Soviet Union acknowledges those facts and alters its plan accordingly, progress in this field of our negotiations will be difficult, if not impossible. My hope in making these remarks this morning is that the Soviet Union authorities will soon take this step toward reality, a step which is indispensable if we are to achieve our common goal of removing the danger of nuclear war.

I shall conclude this morning with a few brief comments on our future work as there is only one more meeting before the recess, and as we doubtless all have been turning over in our minds what we should do on return here. The Canadian delegation believes that

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the next five weeks will give all members of this Committee, particularly the major Powers, a very useful opportunity to review their positions in the light of our past debates and, where appropriate, to work out fresh approaches to the problems before us. We believe that everything possible should be done to ensure that when we reconvene on 30 July the major Powers in this Committee will be able to discuss outstanding problems in a way which will permit definitive progress here before the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly convenes.

We naturally look forward eagerly to progress on the test ban issue and fervently hope the forthcoming talks in Moscow will bring this about. But apart from the cessation of nuclear tests, there is obviously much work to be done in preparation for the resumption of our debate both on general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures. Looking forward to the time when we reassemble here, I should like to mention now a number of the items listed in document ENDC/1/Add.3 which this Committee will no doubt want to discuss. I think some development of the positions of the two sides on those items could be reasonably expected to result in broadening the area of agreement.

First, as regards item 5(e), which is concerned with military bases, I would hope that the Soviet Union will have concluded from our recent discussions that the West will not agree to unilateral proposals which would result in breaking up the Western alliance at the outset of the disarmament process and before a degree of confidence is established which renders military alliances unnecessary. Our discussion of what the Soviet Union chooses to call "bases on foreign territory" -- really bases on territory of allies -- will only be fruitful if it is clearly recognized that this question can only be effectively dealt with within the context of a disarmament programme providing for the gradual and balanced reduction of the military establishments on both sides.

With respect to item 5(f), the reduction of armed forces, the proposals of both sides for first stage reductions are very close together. The Canadian delegation believes that a further effort at compromise should be possible to bridge the remaining gap and that real progress on this issue could be registered before next autumn. Similarly, the question of military expenditures, which is item 5(g) on our agenda, does not seem to raise grave difficulties and we would hope that, given suitable preparation, progress could be achieved here in our next session.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

As for measures which would reserve outer space for peaceful purposes only, item 5(h), the measures proposed in the two draft plans before the Conference are very similar in scope. The Canadian delegation has referred to this question on several occasions in the past and continues to believe that early action which would prohibit the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be agreed upon quickly and that such a prohibition could be put into effect even before agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament. This is an area which we are convinced should be studied carefully during the recess with a view to exploring the possibility of tangible progress when we reconvene.

The last group of measures to which we hope the major Powers would devote attention during the recess are those covered by item 5(j), namely, measures to reduce the risk of war. Here again there is a close similarity between the proposals of the two sides as they appear in their respective drafts. For that reason, we would hope that further study would permit this Committee to report real progress in this area to the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Since both sides recognize the necessity for early agreement on measures in this field, it would also be our hope that they could form the subject of collateral agreements which could come into effect prior to the implementation of general and complete disarmament, that is, agreements in addition to that which we hope will be concluded on the quick means of communicating between Heads of State.

Representatives will have noted that several of the items which I have mentioned on the agenda for general and complete disarmament have been proposed also as collateral measures. This has given me the idea -- which I am sure has occurred to other representatives -- that perhaps the time is ripe for our co-Chairmen to consider a revision of document ENDC/C.1/2 of 2 April 1962, which lists the collateral measures proposed for discussion, and document ENDC/1/Add.3 of 24 July 1962, which lists the measures and topics relating to the first stage of general and complete disarmament. As I said, some topics appear on both lists. The Canadian delegation feels that when we re-assemble the co-Chairmen might produce revised versions of those procedural recommendations concentrating the general and complete disarmament discussions on the most important items, and the discussion of collateral measures on those where early agreement would seem most likely. In developing those agendas, we think the co-Chairmen would like to have suggestions from all other delegations which have views on how our work would be more effectively organized in the resumed session.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): As we are about to part, it may be useful to give my delegation's estimate of the situation in which we find ourselves after these months of negotiation.

It is most regrettable -- and I believe no one at this table will question this -- that we have not made much progress and that we part without being able to report any substantial contribution to the solution of the problems placed before us. The Committee can therefore take little credit for the hours spent at this table.

The key issue of our deliberations -- particularly that to which this day of the week has been devoted, general and complete disarmament -- has been and remains nuclear disarmament. I do not propose to deal now with details of the questions involved. Mr. Burns, who preceded me, dwelt on some of the problems and stressed the difficulties. He implied that the socialist delegations round this table refused to join in an effort to overcome those difficulties. May I most respectfully submit that it is difficult to substantiate that claim if one bears in mind the various proposals made by the Soviet Union at an earlier stage during our discussions and those made by it in the last few months. Those proposals indicate a very serious approach to the problem. They are also significant because of the flexibility shown by the Soviet Union on this issue. Therefore, I cannot share the view presented by Mr. Burns this morning. On the contrary, I would say that in realizing the difficulties involved, the Soviet proposals were submitted in a spirit of conciliation and compromise and should be treated as such.

But this does not remove from our agenda and does not release us from the obligation to dwell on the essential issue involved, that is, the problem of a basic decision on nuclear disarmament. Our view, submitted here over and over again, has been clearly manifested and should not leave room for doubt. We do not want to live in the shadow of nuclear weapons for even one minute longer than is necessary. We have made this clear time after time. Therefore, we are prepared to do away with nuclear weapons at the second or -- if other potential signatories of the disarmament agreement should be ready to do so -- even at the first stage of the disarmament process. On the other hand, the Western Powers approach the issue from a somewhat different point of view. At our meeting on 5 June 1963, Mr. Stelle outlined this approach again when he referred to:

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

"... a gradual and progressive reduction of the military capability of States in all areas of existing armaments, that is, more or less across the board, with such progressive reduction extending over the whole process of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.14C, p.13)

What is behind this approach, as reflected in the above quotation from Mr. Stelle's statement, is apparently what is described as the need for adequate means for national security, and what some call "the growing risk". The first of those reasons is built on the assumption that fear is an effective means to prevent the world from being plunged into a nuclear war, the assumption that fear makes war less likely. Hence the conclusion that States should retain such weapons as would act as a deterrent and thus maintain what is called "the balance of the deterrent". May I add parenthetically -- if a balance of deterrence is possible and could be a reality, which I seriously doubt. Hence also the specific proposals that the greater the potential destructive power of the weapon the smaller the disarmament measure in the earlier stages of the disarmament process.

That is obviously reflected in the proposals concerning nuclear weapon vehicles, bacteriological and chemical warfare and nuclear weapons themselves. Mr. Stelle, in addressing this Committee on 5 June, explaining the United States proposals on the subject and opposing the Soviet approach, found that there was no inherent logic in the latter, that it was "haphazard, helter-skelter and inconsistent" (ENDC/PV.14C, p.15). He said that he failed to understand the "diverse criteria concerning the time periods of reduction which", as he put it, "the Soviet Union has conjured up for its various disarmament measures". (ibid.)

In another place, the representative of the United States even drew an analogy with what he called a "wrecking business" (ibid, p.14). This morning, Mr. Burns referred to what he called the intention of breaking up the Western alliance (supra, p.9).

At first sight all those references are very serious, and the accusations are serious. But are they really? Let us have a look at them. Is there any substance in the claims thus advanced? Some months ago, when addressing this Committee, I tried to show the clear and unmistakable trend reflected in history of mankind's endeavours to dispose of and to ban, first of all, those weapons which are the most dangerous and the most destructive, from poison to biological and chemical weapons. Mankind has lived with rifles and guns for some time now but its conscience has revolted and does revolt when faced with the cruel and particularly destructive weapons that technological progress has brought about; and obviously it also revolts against nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

However, let us not limit the issue to those considerations. Is it not true that with every day that goes by it becomes ever more clear that the existence, maintenance and growth in both number and capacity of nuclear weapons do not increase security? On the contrary, they increase the danger of a nuclear conflict. Let me recall that, on the threshold of the atomic age, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved on "... an essential step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction ..." (A/RES/41(1))

I was quoting from a resolution of the General Assembly adopted in 1946. What was urgent seventeen years ago has by no means become less urgent today. I submit it is even more urgent. That was, indeed, confirmed by a very high authority, and I quote again:

"For men know that a massing of destructive power does not beget security."

Those words were pronounced by President Kennedy in 1962. How can those two pronouncements which I have just quoted find their proper reflection in the United States plan on nuclear disarmament (ENDC/3C) as it stands now? I most humbly submit that there is an obvious contradiction. How can that incontrovertible truth be reconciled with concrete proposals which provide for the maintenance of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons during a long period after we should have embarked upon an effective disarmament process?

I humbly submit that precisely because we are not in the wrecking business but, on the contrary, want to prevent the boat in which all of us are from being wrecked, we should do something about the atomic weapon; otherwise, we shall be wrecked. That is why we insist that nuclear weapons should be immobilized and removed as soon as possible, because it is clear that otherwise any local conflict might easily be transformed into a nuclear war, that a sudden attack will remain a continuous possibility, that nuclear weapons may be further improved and perfected and that the retention of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles to the end of the disarmament process will leave open the possibility of an all-out nuclear attack with all its implications. Those are only some of the risks which remain, but I submit they are sufficient to prove that the situation which will thus

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

be created, will be far from safeguarding the national interests of many nations -- of the very nations on behalf of which those plans are submitted -- and will be very far from safeguarding the peace of the world.

If we are really sincerely determined to embark upon general and complete disarmament, steps ought to be taken which would make that process an irreversible one -- a process which would have entered into a stage from which there would be no return. Once those steps are taken, they are bound to produce effects in many fields -- far beyond their technical and strategic importance. Tension will obviously decrease, confidence will obviously increase. A better international atmosphere will be created and, what is most important, we shall set in motion a chain reaction, and in the wake of that reaction all the other elements leading to a general détente in international relations will be bound to follow.

That result can only be achieved by adopting a proposal which leaves no nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Powers concerned. Mr. Burns, this morning, indicated (supra, p.6) that no single measure can remove this existing threat. I agree; but we should try to do our utmost to achieve such a measure, which would reduce the threat to a minimum. If one leaves the nuclear potential untouched and limits oneself to the allocation of an extremely small amount of what I might call nuclear raw materials for peaceful purposes, can that be regarded as a step which, even to a certain degree, would contribute to the lessening of tension? I agree with Mr. Burns that we cannot produce definite disarmament results by achieving one step, but the steps we take must be essential and they must be irreversible. That is the amendment I would make to Mr. Burns' speech in this field.

By the removal of nuclear weapons, as suggested in the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1), the conditions for the most dangerous armaments race history has known would disappear. The danger of their being used would cease to haunt man on every continent. That, I agree, would be a bold decision to take. But without bold decisions there can be no disarmament; without bold decisions there can be no progress in any field, and no great achievement in any sphere of life can be registered without bold and clear-cut decisions.

There is another issue involved in this field, with which I shall deal now: we should not approach the problem before us -- nor could we solve it -- by taking subjective

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

attitudes and sticking to considerations built on certain philosophies, clearly linked with the strategic and military plans of one alliance. These plans, from which certain concepts on disarmament spring -- are built upon armaments ideas and not upon disarmament ideas. They are built upon the structure of one alliance with all its implications. They are built upon what is the result of planning in armaments and planning in the course of an armaments race. But we cannot reflect -- nor would it serve any useful purpose if we did reflect -- in our disarmament plans the philosophies, structure, policy and plans of one alliance. Once we agree upon disarmament, we must submit the interests and the process of our work to the common goal which is to be achieved.

There is a further issue to which I should like to draw the attention of members of this Committee. We have been engaged here in serious disarmament discussions whilst elsewhere certain new plans were being implemented, and new ideas on armaments were being put into operation. I submit that unilateral measures of that sort do not help us at all. They complicate our task more each day; they accumulate new faits accomplis; they create new arguments in addition to those already existing, which aim at proving that certain things are impossible because they would break up the alliance. That may become, I suggest, an endless process -- we negotiate here and certain new ideas on armaments are being implemented elsewhere. That may not only prevent us from moving forward but make our goal ever more distant. One of these measures -- which I have specifically in mind -- is the creation of multilateral or, as some call it, multinational nuclear forces of NATO. As we have already said, that is bound to create a serious preoccupation in our minds. We have already indicated our views on that matter and we see it as a step -- which it obviously is -- towards nuclear polycentrism, towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I have said, that cannot leave us indifferent. The multiplication of atomic triggers, which is the obvious consequence of such a measure, is fraught with danger and must have an impact on all disarmament discussions today and tomorrow.

That is why, since we are going to part on Friday this week, all these things should be examined and re-examined. Those are the words President Kennedy used in another --

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

but perhaps not altogether different -- context, and we trust that the delegations of the Western Powers will use the recess for this purpose. Speaking the other day at the American University, President Kennedy said: "Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they can be solved by man." (ENDC/95, p.2) So, I submit, is the nuclear dilemma of our age. It should be realized at last that there can be no real peace in the shadow of nuclear weapons; that deterrents, no matter how powerful, the threat of massive retaliation, and armories -- no matter what types of weapons they may store, selective or non-selective -- can never establish true peace. They cannot be the bases of security. It should be clear that no safeguards could, under those circumstances, establish an effective guarantee against the outbreak of a conflict. Even the best "Fail-Safe" system is anything but safe, and we cannot see in any of these systems a safe guarantee against the outbreak of a conflict. I believe that we should finally do away with the fallacy of strategic thought, seeking security where security cannot be found; for, contrary to what a prominent politician of our age has said, security and safety cannot be the sturdy child of terror; survival cannot be the twin brother of annihilation.

Let me conclude by saying that all of us face this question: either we approve of nuclear weapons or we do not. If we do not, we do not want them. If we do not intend to use them, we do not need them and we should therefore dispose of them at the earliest possible stage in the disarmament process. If we can agree upon that, ways and means will be found to pave our road to disarmament. We, the socialist States represented here, will do our utmost to achieve the goal which has been set for us. However, that requires a new approach on the part of the Western Powers and I do not abandon hope that that approach will come about.

Mr. Burns this morning appealed to the Soviet Union to change some of the provisions contained in our proposals (supra, p. 7). I am not replying for the Soviet Union of course, but since Mr. Burns has adopted a point of departure which I find, as I tried to explain earlier, could not lead to progress, the premise on which his appeal is made seems to me to be hardly justifiable. I hope and trust that the Canadian delegation will reflect on this and thus help us to make substantial progress on the issues involved when we meet again after the recess which was decided upon the other day.

Mr. STELIE (United States of America): My delegation listened with great interest to the careful and thoughtful statement made this morning by the representative of Canada with regard to measures of nuclear disarmament. My delegation would like to discuss this topic further and in particular to dwell on some statements that have been made on this subject by the representative of the Soviet Union.

At our meeting of 12 June the Soviet representative asserted that the United States treaty outline contained no agreed formula and no clear-cut obligations for the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons. He went on to say:

"In the preamble to the United States outline only its purpose is proclaimed, but throughout the whole draft treaty, however scrupulously you may study it, nowhere will you find any concrete indications of how this purpose is to be achieved. Furthermore, it follows from the United States outline of a disarmament treaty that the question of the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles is not solved in a definite and unconditional way by the treaty itself." (ENDC/FV.143, p.37)

At the same meeting my delegation pointed out (ibid.) that the United States proposals in stage III do provide for the elimination by all parties to the treaty of all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal. We think this point is clear and requires no further elaboration. What does call for further comment is that the Soviet representative accused the United States of not including in its proposals (ENDC/30) any indications of the concrete manner of achieving that goal. While we admit that we do not know all the answers to the problems connected with the elimination of nuclear weapons, we for our part have come forward with what we submit is an imaginative approach to the solution of these problems.

However, the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) contains neither the means of solving this problem nor a way of approaching the solution. All it says is that in stage II all nuclear stockpiles would be destroyed. There is not a single word there about how this would be accomplished and effectively verified -- that is, how it would be ensured that no such weapons have been retained clandestinely. The difficulties of this problem have been described to us in a very clear manner by the United Kingdom delegation, and it is precisely because of our awareness of those difficulties that we have proposed that a study of this problem be undertaken.

The Soviet representative has chosen to interpret our proposal for such a study as a sign of our unwillingness to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States. The fact is, however, that unless we find a way of implementing an

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

adequately verified total elimination of nuclear weapons from arsenals of States, and unless we join our efforts in searching for such a way, the goal we are seeking to achieve will remain just a goal. We are not engaged in a contest to see which side can best set down our goal -- we are agreed on that. Where honest and energetic work is required is in the setting down of the means of reaching that goal.

No nation today possessing nuclear weapons would be in a position to commit itself to and implement the total destruction of its own nuclear weapon stockpiles in the absence of adequate assurances that other States possessing such weapons would have done the same. We all know that a State retaining just a few nuclear weapons in violation of an agreement would acquire tremendous military and political advantages over those States which fulfil their obligations in good faith.

Thus, we believe, the Soviet Union has two choices. Either it ought to stop accusing the West of not really wanting nuclear disarmament because of the Western proposal for a study of the problems involved in such disarmament or else, if the Soviet Union already possesses sufficient knowledge in this field, it ought to share that information with the rest of the members of the Conference.

In this connexion, as has been mentioned by the representative of Canada, in the Soviet proposals on the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September 1960, paragraph 9 of stage I provided as follows:

"In the first stage, joint studies will be undertaken of the measures to be implemented in the second stage relating to the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons." (A/4505)

This provision seems to indicate that at least in September 1960 the Soviet Union believed that joint efforts would be required to work out a way to implement safeguarded nuclear disarmament. Otherwise there would have been no need for such a Soviet proposal.

However, the Soviet draft treaty submitted to our Conference omits the provision for a study of the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. If this omission means that in the period between 1960 and 1962 the Soviet Union has conducted a study of this problem and has arrived at certain conclusions which, in its view, would make it possible to achieve and to ensure total nuclear disarmament under adequate safeguards, we should be pleased to have those conclusions presented to our Conference, and naturally we should be glad to study them most carefully.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The Soviet representative charged at our meeting of 12 June (ENDC/PV.143) that the United States proposal for a study of nuclear disarmament measures and the problem of verification was made to absolve the parties from a clear-cut obligation to prohibit nuclear weapons and to eliminate them completely, since such an obligation would depend on the outcome of such a study. He went on to ask what the situation would be if the experts at the end of stage I failed to reach unanimous conclusions. (ibid. p.38)

In reply to this, we can only wonder how the Soviet representative envisages nuclear disarmament being implemented in the absence of agreement among all those concerned that such disarmament can be safely carried out without undue risks to any party. The Soviet Union surely would not wish to divest itself of what Soviet spokesmen of highest authority have described as the main component of their defence system, if the Soviet Union were not satisfied that all other States had done the same. In our view, the best way to achieve consensus regarding the methods of carrying out effective nuclear disarmament would be for all parties concerned to join their efforts to work out those methods.

We believe also that we should have dispelled the Soviet representative's concern about such a study*not being undertaken until stage I when we stated on 15 May, and again on 12 June: (ENDC/PV.143, pp.40,41)

"Such an approach, we believe, need not necessarily await the signature of a treaty. It could begin as soon as delegations felt themselves clearly prepared to undertake the necessary studies." (ENDC/PV.132, p.37)

We should like to emphasize that my delegation does not believe that all nuclear disarmament measures have to be left in abeyance pending such a study. Contrary to the Soviet proposals, which lump together all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament in one single stage, the United States proposals provide for measures which could be agreed upon and implemented without a study. I refer, of course, to our proposals contained in stage I of the United States treaty outline which provide for a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapon uses and for the transfer of significant quantities of such materials to purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons. (ENDC/30, pp. 8, 9)

The Soviet representative claimed that at our meeting on 15 May my delegation had pointed out (ENDC/PV.132, p.35) that the fissionable materials would not be taken out of existing nuclear weapons. We submit that that was a distortion of our statement. What we did say at that meeting, and we repeat it again today, was that States should have

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

discretion concerning whether the materials to be transferred would come from weapons already produced or from materials stockpiled for eventual production of weapons. (ibid.) We pointed out that at this early stage of disarmament such a discretionary arrangement would facilitate the implementation and verification of this measure, while a specific provision that materials must come from already existing weapons would complicate the matter by raising, among other things, the difficult problem of revealing weapon designs in the process of verifying the measure. The United States proposal avoids such arrangements as would necessitate revelation at the very outset of the disarmament process of what are closely guarded state secrets which vitally concern national security. However, at the same time, the United States proposals would mean important reductions in the total nuclear-war-making capability of the nuclear Powers. All fissionable material forms part of a State's nuclear potential, and nuclear material is the important stuff of which weapons are made. Our proposals approach the problem directly through the reduction of stocks of fissionable materials from whatever source they may come.

The cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon uses, combined with the transfer of significant quantities of such materials to uses other than in weapons, would halt the spiralling nuclear arms race. These two measures, taken together with an arrangement to prevent the spreading of independent nuclear capabilities to any nation not possessing such capabilities, and with a test ban agreement, would mark a significant step laying the foundation for further, more far-reaching nuclear disarmament measures. They would curb the development of both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the nuclear capabilities of the nuclear Powers and would prevent States not possessing independent nuclear capabilities today from acquiring them. Thus the nuclear threat would be contained and reduced.

As in other fields of disarmament, in the area of nuclear disarmament also, we feel that the "all or nothing" approach adopted by the Soviet Union poses dangers to the cause of disarmament; for we must not forgo those steps we can make with relative ease at the beginning of the disarmament process in the name of our desire to achieve more far-reaching objectives. Rather we must move gradually to our ultimate objectives, using whatever paths appear to be safe for passage and avoiding dangerous short-cuts leading into unknown difficulties. We cannot forget that what is at stake here is the security of States and indeed world peace itself.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We are convinced that the reasons for spreading the implementation of nuclear disarmament over three stages are no less cogent and compelling than is the case in regard to nuclear delivery vehicles. In fact the two problems go hand in hand.

The difficulties elaborated by the United Kingdom delegation with regard to verifying stocks of fissionable materials originating from past production arise precisely from the apparent fact that up to 20 per cent of such past production of some fissionable materials may escape detection even after applying the best possible accounting methods. If a portion of such stocks were hidden in the form of already fabricated weapons or of weapon-grade materials, only the most intensive and thorough search and inspection would be likely to have some chance of turning up such illegally-held stocks.

We know that the Soviet Government feels great concern about opening up the Soviet Union to wide and free-ranging international inspection before the end of the third stage. The United States approach to nuclear disarmament measures tends to reduce the need for such intensive and extensive type of inspection in the early stages of disarmament. That is because hidden stocks of fissionable materials would represent a less serious risk at the time when States would still legally possess some nuclear weapons.

In later stages, when the question of hidden stocks would become crucial, inspection procedures would have become broader in scope. In the atmosphere of greatly increased international confidence brought about by the successful implementation of stage I and beyond of the disarmament programme, we believe the Soviet Union would undoubtedly feel much less sensitive about wide-ranging inspection measures to ensure that all stocks of nuclear weapons and of nuclear delivery vehicles have been liquidated.

The Soviet Union seems to have adopted the three-stage liquidation approach with regard to conventional armaments and armed forces, and we believe it is only reasonable to hope that it will eventually expand acceptance of that approach to all areas of disarmament. For otherwise the whole concept of staging the disarmament process would lose its meaning. If the Soviet Union believes it feasible to effect within the span of one single stage most radical measures as regards nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons, it would seem logical that the less difficult areas of conventional armaments and armed forces could be subject to an equally radical treatment. But while this might be superficially appealing, it would clearly make no sense, and indeed would be contrary to the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) which provides that the disarmament process should be carried out in stages.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

At our meeting on 12 June, the Soviet representative concluded his remarks by making the following conclusions with respect to the Western position on nuclear disarmament. He said:.

"First, the Western Powers have already decided beforehand for themselves that nuclear weapons should be kept, as before, in the armaments of States".

(ENDC/PV.143, p.40)

This first conclusion of the Soviet representative is entirely groundless. For had we prejudged the issue, as he claims we have, we would not have set in our proposals the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States, and we would not have suggested that an active search be conducted for the ways and means of achieving that goal.

The Soviet representative went on to say:

"The second conclusion is that from the hands of the armed forces of individual States or groups of States, nuclear weapons will, perhaps, pass into the hands of a so-called international armed force and, moreover, in such quantities as to enable this international armed force to use them against the mythical danger of nuclear weapons secretly retained by a State or several States " (ibid. p.40)

Here again the Soviet representative seems to read into the United States position something that is not there. He appears to imply that the United States has taken a positive position in favour of equipping an international peace force with nuclear weapons. However, as we said (ibid. p.41) at the same meeting, the position of the United States on this most important question of whether or not -- and if so, when -- nuclear weapons should be made available to the international peace force is well known. We should like to state once again that we do not prejudge or take a firm position on whether or not the international peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons; nor do we take a firm position on the time when such weapons should be made available if they are. What we do say is that this vital and important question is one which should be decided only after the most careful study of all relevant facts and in light of the negotiations on the major areas of a general and complete disarmament programme.

The final conclusion the Soviet representative asserted could be drawn from the Western position in the area of nuclear disarmament was:

"... the Western Powers assume that the international armed forces will have the right to use nuclear weapons in their police operations and, consequently, in the plan of the Western Powers there is no question at all of any real prohibition of nuclear weapons or of their complete destruction and prohibition." (ibid. p.40)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We believe that the first part of the final conclusion by the Soviet representative is effectively refuted by what we have just said regarding our position on whether the international peace force should or should not have nuclear weapons. As to the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their destruction, the Soviet representative knows very well that the United States proposals provide in stage III for the elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles from the arsenals of States. We do not believe it necessary to quote again the relevant provision from the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30/pp.29,30).

True, the United States proposals for stage III do not use the words "prohibition of nuclear weapons". It is self-evident that in a situation where all States possessing nuclear weapons will have eliminated all such weapons from their arsenals in accordance with the provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, possession of such weapons by States would be illegal by all accepted norms of international law and thus prohibited.

However, if the Soviet delegation is particularly concerned about this omission, the United States is quite prepared to include in article I of the Working Draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World) (ENDC/40/Rev.1), submitted by the United States and the USSR on 31 May 1962, appropriate language providing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Specifically, we are prepared to have subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of that article, which sets forth the obligations by States parties to the Treaty with respect to the military establishments of States, read as follows:

"Prohibition and elimination of all nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction; cessation of the production and prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons;"

Inclusion of such language would eliminate the brackets in subparagraph (b) as it stands now, and should, in our view, dispel whatever doubts -- real or imaginary -- the Soviet Union might have had as to the real intentions of the United States concerning nuclear disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Before I begin my main statement for today, I should like to reply to the representatives of Canada and the United States.

This morning the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, put forward certain views regarding the way in which the Western Powers would like to amend article 22 of the Soviet

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1). He warned us that if the Soviet Union did not change its plan for nuclear disarmament, it would be difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to reach agreement. Having expressed that thought, Mr. Burns set forth certain considerations which were actually aimed at fitting the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament to the Procrustean bed of the Western Powers' approach to this problem.

I should like to reply to Mr. Burns immediately. We are prepared to consider with great attention and in the most well-disposed manner any amendments or additions by the Western Powers to the Soviet proposals on questions of nuclear disarmament. But one point should be kept in mind by the representatives of the Western Powers, namely, that any amendments, additions or changes to article 22 of the Soviet draft must be aimed at nuclear disarmament and not at blocking nuclear disarmament or replacing it with measures which would have no effect in regard to eliminating the existing possibilities of waging a nuclear missile war, and which neither eliminate the threat of such a war nor even reduce it to any extent.

The representatives of the Western Powers should bear in mind that we shall not allow the Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament to be reduced to nought. We shall oppose in the most resolute manner any attempt to fit the Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals to the present Western plan. That plan is unacceptable to us because it does not provide for any effective measures of disarmament and preserves the danger of a nuclear war not only during stage I of disarmament but also during stage II and stage III.

Furthermore, even after the completion of the disarmament programme, as directly follows from the statements of the United States representatives, nuclear weapons will not be destroyed. They will remain in the stockpiles, but some sort of international label will be attached to them. Of course, such an approach cannot serve as a basis for nuclear disarmament.

The Western Powers refuse to agree to the elimination of military bases on foreign territories. This question was touched upon again today by Mr. Burns. They even refuse to assume an obligation to renounce the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Western representatives justify this negative position by pointing out that such an obligation on their part would be devoid of "reciprocity". They indicated quite frankly that the Western Powers would not receive any "adequate compensation" for this. Such an attitude of the Western Powers

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

towards this question -- their demand for "adequate compensation" -- cannot fail to evoke certain associations with the figure of Shylock in Shakespeare's well-known play.

The renunciation of military bases on foreign territories or the use of such territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons is not a unilateral measure. When the Western Powers argue about the one-sidedness of this measure they overlook the main point of the question, namely, that military bases on foreign territories are a means of nuclear aggression. Of course, such means of aggression are a target for necessary neutralisation in the very first hours or even minutes of an exchange of nuclear strikes. If you eliminate these bases, you will thereby save the territories on which they are located from the terrible threat of annihilating nuclear strikes.

As "compensation" for the elimination of these foreign military bases, those who have made their territory available for such bases will acquire security and save themselves from nuclear annihilation. It must be assumed that this would be very valuable compensation for the elimination of the bases, to use the term applied to this case by the representatives of the Western Powers. Furthermore, I would remind you of the resolution adopted at the recent Conference of Heads of African States, (ENDC/93/Rev.1) which frankly speaks of the elimination of all foreign military bases in Africa and the withdrawal of all nuclear bombs therefrom. What sort of "adequate compensation" do you want for carrying out this resolution? From whom?

I now pass to my prepared statement.

Today is our last meeting devoted to general and complete disarmament before the recess. Therefore, following what has already become a tradition, before the recess we should like to sum up some of the results of nearly five months of constant discussion, assess the situation that has come about in the Committee and express some views about the future.

In the first place, I should like to note the characteristic feature of the present time, which is that every day all over the world the struggle of the peoples against the threat of a nuclear war, against the armaments race and on behalf of general and complete disarmament is growing and extending. The striving of the peoples to save themselves from the nuclear threat is assuming increasingly active forms. Many Statesmen and public leaders of Western Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America are beginning to support disarmament not only in words but in deeds. They insist on the implementation of measures which would contribute towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war. The

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

leaders of African States who met in Addis Ababa towards the end of May spoke decisively in favour of the immediate implementation of general and complete disarmament, the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, the turning of the African continent into a denuclearized zone and the elimination of foreign military bases in Africa. A proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Northern Europe was recently put forward by the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen (ENDC/PV.141, p.20). We have already noted that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, who for a long time occupied a very important post in the NATO military bloc, has now spoken in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States. These few examples alone confirm quite clearly that the conviction is firmly established in the minds of the peoples that measures to bar the path to war should be taken without wasting time.

These very characteristic features of the international life of these days provide eloquent confirmation of the correctness of the general foreign policy line of the Soviet Union aimed at ensuring lasting peace on earth and peaceful co-existence. The question of war and peace was the central theme of the statement made by President Kennedy on 10 June this year. (ENDC/95) No one can really have any doubt that the views expressed by the President about the need to improve the relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States and the elimination of the "cold war" will meet with the support of the absolute majority of the American people and of the peoples all over the world.

As for the Soviet Union, it has advocated, and always will advocate, lasting peace and good neighbourly relations with all countries. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, said:-

"We desire that good relations between the countries should be brought about in practice, and to achieve this we must spare no efforts in the struggle against those forces which take the stand of carrying on the "cold war" and settling controversial issues by unleashing war".

In what direction events in the world and the relations between States will develop depends on whether this statement by the President of the United States is followed by concrete deeds which would enable us, by our joint efforts, to consolidate peace and eliminate war from the life of man. Up to now our Committee has been, in fact, inactive and its nearly 150 meetings have produced no positive results. This, of course, cannot fail to be a matter of profound regret to those who sincerely strive for peace and disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In evaluating our past negotiations, we are compelled to note that all the efforts of the Soviet Union and of the other Socialist states aimed at an early solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and at ensuring peace have met with the stubborn opposition of the opponents of disarmament. We all know which are the powerful forces in the United States hiding behind the label of the "military - industrial complex." Those forces prefer the armaments race to disarmament, war to peace, and tension in international relations to peaceful co-existence. Those forces have done their utmost to prevent agreement and have condemned our Committee to a sterile marking of time.

In order to direct our work from the very outset into the channel of business-like and effective negotiations and to achieve a speedy solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union prepared and submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2) for the consideration of the participants in these negotiations. But the Soviet Union did not stop there. Having assessed the work of the Conference, the positions of the sides and the wishes expressed by the various delegations, the Soviet Union took a number of important steps to meet the position of the Western Powers and made corresponding changes in its original proposals. We hoped that this constructive attitude of the Soviet Union would help to eliminate the obstacles and facilitate the achievement of agreement. We were entitled to expect that the Western Powers would take corresponding steps so that it would be possible to reach agreement.

But what was the reply of the Western Powers? What did they bring to the negotiations? They came with empty hands. There were no constructive proposals in their briefcases and in all their statements there was only one theme -- accept our proposals -- and that was all. Since we are summing up certain results, it will not do any harm to remind the Committee of what has been done by the Soviet Government to facilitate the success of the disarmament negotiations.

We should like this to be taken into account by the other delegations in preparing their positions for the next round of negotiations at the end of the recess.

I. An important step, far-reaching in its consequences, was our proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a strictly limited, agreed number of certain types of missiles until the end of stage II of disarmament. (ENDC/2/Rev.1; Art.5) We must say quite frankly -- and this can be seen clearly enough from our original draft treaty -- that the Soviet Union deems it necessary to destroy completely all means of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

delivery in stage I of disarmament. And if we propose this measure, that is, the retention of a certain number of missiles by the United States and the Soviet Union, it is prompted exclusively by our desire to move forward the negotiations on the most important and urgent question of our time, namely, the problem of the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war.

2. I believe that we all remember how in the course of past negotiations between ourselves and the Western Powers differences arose regarding the level of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in stage I of disarmament. We were, and still are, of the opinion that the lower this level and the smaller the armed forces at the disposal of States, the better it will be for disarmament and for ensuring peace on earth. However, in order to bring the positions of the two sides closer together, on this question also we made a move to meet the position of the Western Powers and agreed to increase the previously proposed level of armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States in stage I of disarmament to 1,900,000 men. In doing so, the Soviet Union made a great step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers. However, on this question also, the Western Powers continue to adhere to their old position. If the United States had taken exactly the same step forward as was taken by the Soviet Union, we should have already been able to put on record a mutually acceptable solution of this problem.

3. The Soviet Union also made a move towards the position of the Western Powers on the question of the periods for the implementation of stage I of disarmament and of the disarmament programme as a whole. But this step forward on our part has also remained without a response from the Western Powers.

4. It is well known that both in regard to the levels of armed forces and in regard to conventional armaments, the Soviet Union is an advocate of radical measures leading to substantial reductions. That was at the base of our original draft treaty when we proposed that by the end of stage I States should retain only such quantities of armaments as would be needed to equip the agreed levels of armed forces of the respective States. However, in the hope of facilitating by this step of ours the achievement of agreement on more important issues, we made a move towards the position of the Western Powers on the question of the reduction of conventional armaments and agreed with their proposal that in the course of stage I conventional armaments should be reduced by 30 per cent.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

5. The Soviet Union made a move towards the position of the Western Powers on other questions as well. When the United States proposed certain measures for stage I in order, as it stated, to reduce the risk of war by accident, (ENDC/70) the Soviet Union, for its part, proposed such measures (ENDC/75 and ENDC/77) in this respect as would be of real significance for reducing such a risk. The United States did not respond to these proposals of ours either.

6. The Soviet Government paid great attention to the wishes expressed by some of the non-aligned States regarding the desirability of implementing measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the earliest phases of disarmament. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to make corresponding changes in its draft treaty. We are prepared to explore possibilities of eliminating the nuclear threat in this way, provided, of course, that the Western Powers, whose turn it is now to speak agree to this.

We attach great importance to nuclear disarmament. As Mr. Khrushchev said: "The main pivot, the core of disarmament lies in the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons". It would be no exaggeration to say that it depends precisely on the solution of these questions whether the danger of nuclear annihilation will be eliminated for ever, or whether it will hang perpetually over mankind.

Article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty provides for a complex of radical measures, the implementation of which would afford a complete solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. This article provides for the liquidation of all nuclear weapon stockpiles the cessation of their production and the enactment of special legislation, in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each State, completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by organizations or individuals to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence. These three measures constitute the substance of nuclear disarmament. If a single one of them were to be disregarded, real nuclear disarmament would in fact no longer exist and nuclear weapons in one form or another could again be made use of at any moment. That is why the Soviet Union firmly insists on the implementation of all these three measures and resolutely objects to attempts to emasculate the very substance of disarmament.

By transferring the whole complex of these measures from stage II to stage I, we will secure the result that the problem of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war will be solved at the very beginning of the disarmament process, and this is a very important point, a very serious measure, which is necessary in the earliest stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Are the Western Powers willing to agree to this? Do they intend to meet the innermost aspirations of the peoples? The peoples of the whole world are impatiently awaiting a reply to this question from the Western Powers.

Unfortunately, we have to note that the Western Powers' position in this regard envisages no realistic disarmament measures. The position of the United States on the nuclear question has been frozen at the stage where the United States possessed the atomic monopoly. Responsible people in the United States cannot reconcile themselves to the idea that in these days nuclear weapons are for them not an advantage, but a source of serious danger, and the sooner this danger is eliminated, the easier will the peoples breathe, including the people of the United States. The true security of States is not in nuclear weapons, but in disarmament, in the destruction of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the present position of the United States in regard to nuclear disarmament provides in stage I merely for the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials and the transfer of 50 tons of uranium-235 to peaceful purposes. In other words, it provides for measures which would leave the main problem completely untouched, namely, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, because even after the measures proposed by the United States for stage I have been implemented, States would retain intact -- and I emphasize this aspect -- immense stockpiles of accumulated fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Therein lies the main weakness, the main defect, of the United States proposals, which makes them absolutely unacceptable to us. To this should also be added the fact that the implementation of the United States proposal for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials (ENDC/30, pp.8,9) would lead to the establishment of foreign control of the nuclear industry, and this, without nuclear disarmament measures, that is, without the destruction of all stockpiles of accumulated nuclear weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States, without the complete prohibition of these weapons of mass destruction, would simply amount to military intelligence, which would be very dangerous to the security of States.

The establishment of such control when 100 per cent of the nuclear weapons is retained, when States retain 70 per cent of the means of delivery of these weapons, would be a very serious threat to the security of all peaceloving States. We cannot ignore this. The United States proposals would merely spread dangerous illusions in the world, giving people the impression that something was being done to eliminate or at least to reduce the threat of a nuclear war, whereas in actual fact, this danger would continue to hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is clear from the United States Outline of Basic Provisions for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30) that it provides for no real measures in the field of nuclear disarmament either in stage I or in subsequent stages of disarmament. The main thing is missing in this Outline. There is no prohibition of nuclear weapons, no liquidation of all their stockpiles. This means that, under the United States Outline, even after general and complete disarmament is completed, nuclear weapons would remain in the armaments of States or, as an alternative, the possession of nuclear weapons might be covered by the label of "international armed forces". This means that the possibility of using weapons against peoples and the threat of nuclear annihilation would remain.

In our approach to the measures which should constitute the main content of stage I of disarmament, we have invariably been guided by one desire, namely, that these measures should be aimed at accomplishing the key task of disarmament -- the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war. In the circumstances in which our Western partners stubbornly refuse without any justification to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons in stage I, which would be a final solution of the problem of averting the danger of a nuclear conflict, we propose another way. It is well known that in the course of our previous negotiations the Western Powers categorically opposed the Soviet Union's proposal for the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the beginning of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Art.5). In doing so, they said that after starting disarmament States would need for a certain period of time what they called a "protective umbrella". Although it was impossible to regard those arguments of the Western Powers as well-founded, the Soviet Government, in order to move the question of disarmament out of the impasse and to start a real movement forward, agreed in September 1962 (A/PV.1127, prov.pp.38-40) that, when the means of delivery of nuclear weapons were destroyed in stage I, an exception should be made for a strictly limited agreed number of certain types of missiles. These missiles to be retained could serve as an additional safeguard of the security of States during the first two stages of disarmament. In this matter we made an important concession to our Western partners in the disarmament negotiations. We proposed to them a compromise which, without running counter to the task of averting the threat of a nuclear missile war, at the same time took into account the views of the Western Powers and opened up prospects for an agreed solution.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As the representative of India, Mr. Lall, said at our meeting of 9 May when evaluating our proposal:

"... it contains possibilities, perhaps through variations, to move us further forward in the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles." (ENDC/PV.129, p.18)

In addition to all the socialist States, the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Brazil, Ethiopia and Nigeria welcomed the Soviet Union's proposal in our Committee.

The Soviet Union proposes that, in stage I of disarmament, all means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed, with the exception of an agreed strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and missiles in the ground-to-air category which would be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of stage II of disarmament. In the course of the negotiations we have repeatedly explained in detail and from every angle the substance of our proposal which would enable us right from the start of disarmament to reduce to nought the threat of a nuclear missile war and thereby to respond, not in words but in deeds, to the most ardent desire of all peoples.

Everyone realizes that if all nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles were destroyed, as provided for in stage I of the Soviet draft treaty, the nuclear weapons would in fact be, as it were, riveted to their storage places and, consequently, immobilized. Thus the threat of a nuclear missile war would be practically eliminated.

Everything has been done on the Soviet side to ensure the achievement of agreement on the question of measures relating to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place at the Conference table, we have been at great pains to enable all the members of the Committee to obtain a thorough understanding of the substance of the Soviet Government's proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of certain types of missiles till the end of stage II. We have explained all the aspects of this proposal and we have given exhaustive replies to all the questions of the Western representatives, replies which enabled them to get a clear idea of the substance of the Soviet Union's proposal and to carry on a businesslike and constructive discussion of this question.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We have to note with regret, however, that we have not succeeded in making any progress here and that the delegations are leaving for the recess without being any nearer to the solution of this question. The reason is always the same: the Western Powers' unwillingness to enter into an agreement; their refusal to make any attempt to achieve agreement on a mutually-acceptable basis.

The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, spoke very frankly about the Western Powers' attitude towards nuclear disarmament. At our meeting of 12 June he said that the Western Powers preferred to retain nuclear weapons for at least the first two stages of disarmament and possibly into the third stage as a "balanced deterrent" (ENDC/PV.143, p. 25).

Of course, if we approach the solution of the disarmament problem in that way, we shall never solve it. The theory of the "balanced deterrent" which the representatives of the Western Powers have been advocating here, the concept of "balance of forces" and "deterrent", is in practice a screen for the present armaments race. While within our Committee the representatives of the NATO countries reject the Soviet Union's proposals aimed at eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, outside the Committee the NATO countries are concentrating their efforts on accelerating military preparations and on the armaments race. They have decided on the creation of a so-called "inter-allied" NATO nuclear force which ensures the access of the West German militarists to nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has pointed out repeatedly that, in the present conditions, in the era of nuclear missile weapons, it is impossible to consider war with old yardsticks, or to think of it in old concepts.

President Kennedy of the United States, speaking on 10 June at the American University in Washington, also said, as it is well known, that in our time "total war makes no sense ...". (ENDC/95,p.1). In that speech the United States President appealed to the United States to re-examine its approach to the international situation and he expressed himself in favour of seeking ways which would rid mankind of the armaments race and of the threat of a world thermonuclear war. The main thing now is that those good words should be followed by appropriate deeds, that those principles should be given practical embodiment in the position of the United States at the disarmament negotiations.

The Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, in his replies to questions put to him by the editors-in-chief of "Pravda" and "Izvestia" in connexion with President Kennedy's speech said, in particular:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"Those words on peace must be supported by practical deeds. In those practical deeds and actions the United States Government will be met with the understanding and support of the Soviet Government. We on our part will spare no effort to find a solution to outstanding problems and to bring about good relations between the great Powers."

We believe that during the forthcoming recess all the parties concerned will reflect in every way upon their positions in regard to general and complete disarmament. We should like to hope that our Western partners in these negotiations, on returning to Geneva in five weeks' time, will take up positions which will help to bring about the achievement of a speedy agreement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forty-sixth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mbu, the representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Poland, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 21 June 1963, at 10.30. a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.